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Abstract 
Matching donations without crowding out? 
Some theoretical considerations, a field, and a lab experiment* 
 
 
Is there a way of matching donations that avoids crowding out? We introduce a 
novel matching method where the matched amount is allocated to a different pro-
ject, present some simple theoretical considerations that predict reduced crowd-
ing out or more crowding in (depending on the degree of substitutability between 
the two projects) and present evidence from a large-scale natural field experiment 
and a laboratory experiment. Similar to findings in the literature, conventional 
matching for the same project results in partial crowding out in the field experi-
ment and, as predicted, crowding out is reduced under the novel matching 
scheme. The lab experiment provides more fine-tuned evidence for the change in 
crowding and yields further support for the theory: the novel matching method 
works best when the two projects are complements rather than substitutes. 
 
 
Keywords: Charitable giving, Matched fundraising, Natural field experiment 
 
JEL classification: C93, D64, D 12.
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1 Introduction 
 
Matched fundraising, in which a large donor tops up individual donations according to some 
scheme, is popular among charitable organizations. Recent studies based on field experiments 
(see, for example, Karlan and List 2007 or Huck and Rasul 2011) demonstrate, however, that 
matched fundraising has a downside: it generates substantial crowding out and appears 
inferior to solicitation schemes that simply announce a lead gift (Huck, Rasul, and Shephard 
2015). One reason why fundraisers might be forced to use matched fundraising nevertheless is 
competition. Holding everything else constant, donors will always prefer to give money to 
fundraising drives that offer more matching rather than less. (Simply notice that with 
matching a donor’s budget set rotates outward.) Hence, the question arises, whether it is 
possible to design an alternative matching scheme that is attractive to donors and avoids 
crowding out or perhaps even generates some crowding in. In this paper, we present some 
simple theoretical considerations that suggest that a matching scheme in which the matched 
money is allocated to a different project should outperform standard matching for the same 
project. The model also suggests that the effect of matching improves when the two projects 
become less substitutable. We test these predictions in the field and in the lab. 
  
In the field experiment, we confirm crowding out for standard linear matching: the average 
donation given is lower under standard matching than in a pure lead donor treatment that 
serves as a control. (We refer to a “lead donor” environment whenever money offered by a 
lead donor before a fundraising drive starts is given unconditionally and simply announced, 
that is, when it is not used for matching.) Regarding our main hypothesis, we find evidence 
for reduced crowding out when the matched amount is allocated to an alternative project. The 
overall performance of both matching schemes is, however, not significantly different. The 
reason for these weak differences is probably that the two projects are quite similar such that 
the advantage of reduced substitutability does not fully kick in. 
In order to provide a more fine-tuned test for our theoretical predictions we conduct a 
laboratory experiment. In the lab we compare standard matching with two versions of the 
proposed alternative matching: in one version the partner project receiving the matching 
money is a complement, while in the other version it is a substitute.  We find that relative to 
standard matching donations increase significantly when the partner project is a complement. 
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When the partner project is a substitute, the increase is lower and the difference to standard 
matching is non-significant.  
These results suggest that charitable organizations might substantially improve their 
fundraising success through such alternative forms of matching provided they can find a 
suitable partner project that is not perceived as a close substitute or, ideally, is perceived as a 
complement.  
 
 
2 Literature 
 
There has been a multitude of studies employing laboratory and field experiments analyzing 
matched fundraising. For example, Karlan and List (2007) conclude from a direct mail 
solicitation to prior donors that the introduction of a simple (1:1) matching scheme 
significantly increases the probability of giving but reduces the average donation given. The 
overall return is significantly higher with matching than without. Further increases in the 
matching rate (2:1 or 3:1) have little, if any, effect. Controlling for the informational role of 
the presence of a lead donor, Huck and Rasul (2011) show that crowding out is already quite 
severe with low matching rates (0.5:1). In Eckel and Grossman (2008), the matching schemes 
(0.25:1 and 0.33:1) generate average donations similar to those without matching but 
surprisingly reduce response rates for repeat donors. Meier (2007) finds that matching 
increases participation in the short term but shows that in the long term, when matching 
ceases to be in place, contribution rates decline such that the overall long-run effect of one 
round of matching is negative. 
  
It has also been shown that larger lead gifts increase the success of fundraising campaigns 
(List and Lucking-Reiley 2002). However, only few studies hold lead gifts constant and 
compare several fundraising schemes in order to understand how the initial contribution can 
be best used to stipulate subsequent “small money” donations.  Huck and Rasul (2011) 
compare standard matching to a pure lead gift environment which allows them to come up 
with precise estimates of the crowding out effect. Huck, Rasul, and Shephard (2015) estimate 
a structural model based on experimental data and show that, in the environment they study, 
linear matching will never outperform a simple lead donor treatment in which the lead donor 
offers his money unconditionally and recipients of the fundraising drive are informed about 
this lead donation. In Gneezy et al. (2014) a lead donor treatment outperforms standard linear 
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matching in every dimension (response rate and average positive donation). Also, they find 
that a lead donor treatment in which the lead gift is said to cover overhead costs results in 
even higher total contributions. Rondeau and List (2008) compare, among others, a lead donor 
(challenge gift) campaign and a (1:1) matching campaign, but they use a different context—a 
threshold public good setup with a refund in case the threshold is not met. They conclude that 
announcing a lead donor increases average donations and the probability of giving. In their 
experiment, matching does not increase the success of the fundraising drive and they conclude 
that it is inferior to a challenge gift.  
 
 
3 Some theoretical considerations 
 
Consider a model with three goods: a composite good that captures private consumption y  
and two charitable goods, a and b, where we assume that donors care about their individual 
contributions.1 We restrict our attention to situations where the donor makes only one 
decision about an out-of-pocket amount, x, that he wants to contribute from his income, I, to a 
fundraising drive. How x is mapped into a and b depends on the fundraising strategy of the 
charitable organization.  
 
We assume that donors have a quasi-linear utility function  
 
),(),,( bauybayU +=  
 
where xIy −=  is private consumption, and a  and b  denote the amounts of money 
generated for the two projects. We assume 0, >′′ ba uu  and 0, <′′′′ bbaa uu . Notice that the cross 
derivative abu ′′  is negative for substitutes and positive for complements. (For perfect 
substitutes we would have abbbaa uuu ′′=′′=′′ .) 
 
Now consider a fundraising drive where donors make a single decision about x  and where 
matching schemes, a(x) and b(x), are in place that map the donation x into effective 
contributions to the two charitable goods. Then we can write the donor’s utility function as 
                                                          
1 See Huck, Rasul and Shephard 2015 for a similar approach. 
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))(),(()( xbxauxIxU +−= . 
 
For linear matching schemes, which we employ in the experiments, we have xxa λ=)(  and 
xxb θ=)( . The donor’s optimal choice is given by the first-order condition 
 
01 =′+′+− ba uu θλ . 
 
We are interested in crowding effects, that is, in how the match rates, λ  and θ , affect the 
donation x . We can easily derive these crowding effects through the implicit function 
theorem which yields 
bbabaa
abaaa
uuu
ubuau
d
dx
′′+′′+′′
′′+′′+′
−= 22 2 θθλλλ
 
and 
bbabaa
abbbb
uuu
uaubu
d
dx
′′+′′+′′
′′+′′+′
−= 22 2 θθλλθ
. 
 
Inspecting the numerator of these derivatives, it becomes clear that the degree of relative risk 
aversion will be relevant for crowding, while inspecting the denominator underlines the role 
of substitutability between the two charitable goods.  
 
Let’s say that the donor is asked to contribute to good a. Then for matching in the same good 
(and no matching in the other, that is, for 0=θ ) we get 
 
aa
aaa
u
uau
d
dx
′′
′′+′
−= 2λλ
 
 
and we have crowding out, 0<
λd
dx  (as has been documented by the previous literature), if 
and only if 1>
′
′′
−
a
aa
u
ua
. This reveals a link between relative risk aversion and crowding. For 
example, if u (for )0=b  exhibits CRRA with a coefficient greater than 1 there will always be 
crowding out. 
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For matching in the other good, b, we have to consider 
θd
dx . Assuming that the two goods are 
either (weak) substitutes or, in case of complementarity, that abu ′′  is not too large we get a 
simple condition for the absence of crowding out or some crowding in: 
 
10 ≤
′
′′
−
′
′′
−⇔≥
b
ab
b
bb
u
ua
u
ub
d
dx
θ
.     (1) 
 
Inspecting (1) reveals the key insight that we take away from this model sketch: the condition 
is easier to fulfill the weaker the substitutability between the two charitable goods is, hence, 
the alternative matching scheme will be more effective than standard matching provided the 
match is allocated to a second project that is not a perfect substitute for the first. Moreover, 
the effectiveness of the alternative scheme should increase when the degree of substitutability 
falls. 
 
The considerations presented in this section lead to following testable implications: 
1: An alternative matching scheme where the match is allocated to a different project results 
in less crowding out (or more crowding in) if the two projects are not near substitutes. 
2: The alternative matching performs better when the two projects are complements rather 
than substitutes. 
 
 
 
4 A natural field experiment 
 
In order to test the predictions of the model we conducted a field experiment in charitable 
giving implementing two lead donor treatments, a standard (1:1) matching treatment, and an 
alternative matching treatment with the same matching rate. In terms of our model this means 
we examine 
  
T1: 1=λ , 0=θ  (donations are allocated to the first project)  
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T2: 0=λ , 1=θ  (donations are allocated to the second project) 
T3: 2=λ , 0=θ  (donations are allocated to the first project and are doubled) 
T4: 1=λ , 1=θ  (donations are allocated to the first project and the matched money is 
allocated to the second project) 
 
In order to avoid the possibility of spillovers from previous fundraising campaigns, we 
decided to conduct our experiment with an institution that had a clean slate, that is, that had 
previously not engaged in any (“small money”) fundraising activities. This led to the choice 
of the municipal opera house of Frankfurt/Main. In April 2014, the opera house sent out 
25,000 solicitation letters to opera visitors, asking them to support one or two social youth 
projects organized by the opera house. Both projects are part of the “JETZT! OPER FÜR 
DICH” [“NOW! OPERA FOR YOU”] program, which enhances cultural education and social 
integration. The first project (“Aramsamsam”) benefits small children aged 2–4 and gives 
children their first contact with classical music regardless of their social background. The 
second project (“Opera Bus”) runs an opera bus that visits schools, pediatric wards in 
hospitals, and social enterprises for the disabled. Those two projects are likely to be perceived 
as substitutes given that they benefit different recipients in a similar way. But there are also 
marked differences between the projects thus we do not expect them to be perceived as 
perfect substitutes. Consequently, condition (1) has a chance to hold 
 
The recipients were randomly selected from the opera’s database of individuals who had 
visited at least one opera performance since 2010. Recipients were randomly assigned to one 
of four treatment groups such that there were over 6,000 subjects per treatment. In the first 
base treatment (T1), the letter asks for donations for the first project (Aramsamsam) and 
informs the reader that a sponsor has already been attracted who will support the “JETZT!” 
campaign (of which Aramsamsam is part) by donating €30,000. In the second base treatment 
(T2), the letter asks for donations for the second project (Opera Bus) and, similarly to T1, 
announces a lead donor who will support the “JETZT!” campaign by donating €30,000. Those 
two base treatments allow us to compare the basic desirability of the two projects. In the 
traditional matching treatment (T3) the letter asks for donations for the main project 
(Aramsamsam) and announces an anonymous sponsor who will match the donations 1:1 up to 
an amount of €30,000. In the new matching scheme (T4) the letter asks for donations for the 
main project (Aramsamsam) and announces a donor who will give the same amount to 
support another project (Opera Bus) up to an amount of €30,000. 
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The mail-out letters were identical in all treatments with the exception of two paragraphs. The 
exact format and wording of the mail-out is provided in the Appendix A. 
 
We would like to point a few facts. First, the projects we are considering are of an essentially 
linearly expandable nature such that all donations will matter on the margin. With more 
money, the opera house will be able to organize more sessions with small children and more 
visits of the Opera Bus. There are no explicit or implicit targets in the mailing. Second, 
recipients are told the truth. The lead gift was actually provided and each matching scheme 
was implemented. The value of matches across all treatments was capped at €30,000, which 
ensured subjects were told the truth even if the campaign was more successful than 
anticipated. Crucially, this holds the commitment of the lead donor and, hence, the signal of 
quality, constant across treatments. Note, that holding the large donation constant among 
treatments also reflects the situation in which a charitable organization has already identified a 
big donor and now has to decide how to utilize the lead gift for subsequent “small money” 
fundraising. 
 
In the appendix, Table B1, we analyze the random assignment of recipients into treatments. A 
number of recipient characteristics are available in the opera house’s database, which records 
information on individuals that visited an opera house performance in the recent past. Due to 
randomization, recipients are, in most cases, not significantly different to each other across 
the treatments, which is confirmed by t-tests of equality of means for the available 
demographic variables (female dummy, couple dummy, academic title dummy for a PhD or 
professorship, subscriber dummy and Frankfurt resident dummy), and activity variables (days 
since last order in the database, number of orders in the database). For the large number of 
variables and treatments and, hence, number of t-tests, the number of tests with p-values at 
and below 0.05 is in the expected range and does not contradict random assignment (2, 3, and 
3 at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively out of 54 tests). However, given that we do detect some 
significant differences between the treatment groups, we will control for this lack of balance 
when analyzing the data on donations. 
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Results  
The fundraising campaign generated a total of €46,159 in donations from 447 individuals,2 
thus yielding an overall response rate of 1.8%. Most donations arrived within the first and 
second month after the mail-out (344 and 79 respectively), but some donations trickled in 
during the subsequent months. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on donations by 
treatment. The average response rate varies between 1.5% and 2.1% and the average positive 
donation ranges between €88 and €121 depending on the treatment. The return per mailing 
varies between €1.68 and €2.30. The distribution of donations is skewed with a median at €50 
and donations as high as €1000 present in every treatment. In T3 there were two very high 
donations: In one case, a donor gave €20143 and in another case, one donor donated €1000 
twice, which we count as one €2000 donation.4  
 
Table 2: Descriptives 
Mean, standard error in parentheses 
Treatment Treatment description Number 
of 
recipients 
Numbe
r of 
donatio
ns 
Response 
rate 
Average 
positive 
donation 
Med
ian 
Minim
um 
Maximu
m 
Return 
Column    I II    III 
T1 Lead donor (Aramsamsam) 6,143 93 0.0151 121.29 50 5 1000 1.836 
    (.0016) (18.09)    (.3316) 
T2 Lead donor (Opera Bus) 6,143 106 0.0173 97.36 50 10 1000 1.680 
    (.0017) (11.50)    (.2554) 
T3 Standard matching (Aramsamsam + 
Aramsamsam) 
6,143 129 0.0210 109.37 50 5 2014 2.297 
    (.0018) (22.56)    (.5126) 
T4 Alternative matching (Aramsamsam 
+ Opera Bus) 
6,144 119 0.0194 87.81 50 10 1000 1.701 
    (.0018) (10.79)    (.2591) 
Notes: Response rate is not significantly different between treatments with the exception for the difference between T1 
and T3 (Fisher’s exact test: p=0.02) and between T1 and T4 (Fisher’s exact test: p=0.08). Average positive donation is 
not significantly different between treatments with the exception for the difference between T2 and T3 (MWU-Test: 
p=0.07). Return is not significantly different between treatments with the exception for the difference between T1 and 
T3 (MWU-Test: p=0.02) and between T1 and T4 (MWU-Test: p=0.07). 
 
 
                                                          
2 Three donors donated twice. 
3 The donor explained this particular amount with the year of donation—2014. 
4 There were two other donors who donated twice; one donated €250 and €500 in T3 (counted as €750) and one 
donated €150 twice in T4 (counted as €300). 
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Table 3: Regression results 
 
Specification Response  Value of donations (nonzero) Return  
      
Dependent variable Donation dummy log(donation)| 
donation >0 
log(donation)| 
donation >0 
log(donation+1) log(donation+1) 
      
Method  probit (m.e.)  OLS QRE (m.e. at 
median) 
OLS tobit (m.e. y*) 
Column I II III IV V 
T2: Lead donor (Opera 
Bus) 
0.003 -0.002 -0.021 0.011 0.012 
 (0.002) (0.126) (0.131) (0.010) (0.010) 
      
T3: Standard matching 
(Aramsamsam + 
Aramsamsam) 
0.006** -0.237** -0.282** 0.020** 0.024** 
 (0.002) (0.120) (0.125) (0.010) (0.010) 
      
T4: Alternative 
matching 
(Aramsamsam + Opera 
Bus) 
0.004* -0.104 -0.086 0.014 0.018* 
 (0.002) (0.122) (0.127) (0.010) (0.010) 
      
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
      
Observations 24573 447 447 24573 24573 
R2  0.145  0.016  
Pseudo R2 0.062  0.051  0.043 
Wald-test p-value      
T3=T4 0.550 0.238 0.095 0.498 0.570 
T3>=T4 0.725 0.119 0.048 0.751 0.715 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Controls include: number of orders, 
average value of order, time since last activity, and dummies for subscription holder, female, couple, PhD or 
professor, Frankfurt resident. In tobit regression the lower limit is set to zero. The full estimation results are 
presented in the appendix, Table B2. 
 
Given that we have detected some imbalances between our treatment groups, it is important to 
condition on individual characteristics when analyzing the results. In Table 3, we present a 
number of regression results that control for donor characteristics. We also take care of the 
skewness of the distribution by taking logs when applicable5 and of outliers by presenting the 
results from quantile regression. The base treatment is T1. In the first column, we analyze the 
responses by running a probit specification and present marginal effects. In the second and 
third, we look only at positive donations. The second column presents results from a simple 
OLS regression and the third column shows marginal effects from a quantile regression at the 
median being more robust to outliers than OLS. The dependent variable is the logarithm of 
                                                          
5 The results from quantile regression with levels of positive donations instead of logs lead to the same 
conclusions. 
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(positive) donations in both specifications. The last two columns look at the return from the 
mail-out and show regression results from a simple OLS (Column IV) and marginal effects 
from a tobit regression (Column V) which is better suited for the underlying distribution with 
many zeros. The dependent variable is in both cases given by the logged amount of donations 
plus one. 
The first important result is that we do observe crowding out with the standard matching 
scheme. The coefficient on the standard matching treatment (T3) is negative and significant 
in, both, an OLS regression (Table 3, Column II) and a quantile regression (Table 3, Column 
III) for the subsample of positive donations. This confirms a significant negative effect of 
matching on the value of positive donations given relative to the lead donor treatment (T1). 
(Notice that our model predictions about crowding hold for interior solutions, hence, the focus 
on positive donations.)  
The second important result is that we observe reduced crowding out with the alternative 
matching scheme. This can be seen by inspecting the coefficient on the alternative matching 
(T4) in Table 3, Column II and III and comparing it to standard matching (T3). We find that 
T4 does not significantly reduce the average donation suggesting there is no crowding out. 
Figure 4 shows that for the quantile regression the coefficient on T4 is virtually zero at every 
percentile (i.e. not only at the median). Moreover, the coefficient on T4 is small compared to 
that of T3 (in absolute terms). While the simple matching scheme (T3) significantly reduces 
the average donation given by as much as 23–28%, a Wald test following the quantile 
regression rejects the null of T3 being larger than T4 at p < 5%, confirming that there is less 
crowding out in T4 than in T3. Given that the second project on its own is not considered 
better than the first (all coefficients on T2 are small and not significant), this suggests that 
matching with another good can indeed improve the effectiveness of matching. 
Beyond that we find that both matching treatments significantly increase the response rate 
(probit regression: Table 3, Column I) when compared to the lead donor treatment.6 In the 
case of standard matching, the combined effect of more responses with lower amounts yields 
an increase in the overall return of around 2–2.4% (Table 3, Column IV and V). From that, we 
conclude that, in our environment, matching works better than the pure lead donor treatment. 
This result differs from the findings of the earlier literature. For the alternative matching 
                                                          
6 Rare events logit (King and Zeng 2001) suggests slightly lower coefficients of T2, T3, and T4 being 0.002, 
0.005, and 0.003 respectively (with the same significance level). 
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scheme, the overall performance is also better than in the lead donor treatment. However, 
there is no significant difference in overall performance between the two matching treatments 
(Wald test p=0.498 and p=0.570 for OLS and tobit regression respectively).  
 
Figure 2: T4 coefficient: Quantile regression estimates 
 
Note: solid line – coefficient on T4 from quartile regression for all percentiles of logged 
positive donations, grey area – 95% confidence interval, dashed line – OLS coefficient on 
T4, dotted line – 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
5 Laboratory experiment 
As our field experiment only covered some aspects of the theoretical model and yielded only 
weak support for the superiority of the alternative matching scheme (after all, the overall 
performance remained unchanged) we followed up our investigation in the laboratory. In the 
laboratory we are also able to address the prediction that crowding varies with the degree of 
substitutability between base and partner project. Specifically, we examine matching with a 
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substitutionary and a complementary project. The projects in the field experiment were likely 
to be perceived as substitutes and they may have been too close to each other to make a 
difference (both in terms of the statistical analysis and in terms of the predictions of the 
model).  
In the lab experiment, we concentrate on the comparison between standard matching and 
alternative matching leaving out lead donor treatments. Moreover, the design of the 
experiment allows for a better focus on the intensive margin yielding the statistical analysis 
more intuitive. This helps us to investigate the question of crowding out and overall 
performance in much finer detail. The convenience of the laboratory also allows us to add two 
additional dimensions: the role of the matching rates and suggestions. Finally, the lab 
experiment provides evidence for a different, non-opera context. 
We worked together with the local branch of Ingenieure ohne Grenzen (Engineers without 
Borders). Ingenieure ohne Grenzen implement a broad range of projects in developing 
countries. Working with local partner organizations they bring the expertise for, among 
others, water provision projects and participate in school construction projects. We chose two 
water provision projects and two school construction projects for our experiment. One water 
and one school project were being carried out in the village of Chonyonyo in Tanzania and 
the remaining two projects in the village of Gayaza in Uganda. We argue that water and 
school projects in the same village are likely to be perceived as complements while water 
provision in Tanzania and in Uganda should be considered substitutes as should school 
construction in Tanzania and Uganda. We chose Tanzania and Uganda to be similar countries 
in terms of economic indicators and the importance of development aid.  
We implement a within-subject design with a small between-subject element that is 
documented in appendix B. Apart from the different types of matching we also implement 
different matching rates (50%, 100%, and 150%) as well as random suggestions. Some 
participants could make their basic donations towards a water project and others towards a 
school project and this was not changed throughout the experiment. Figure 3 summarizes the 
different treatments.  
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Figure 3: Different treatments implemented. 
  Base project water  Base project school 
Type of 
matching 
Donation 
to… +  
matching 
to… 
Matching rate Donation 
to… +  
matching 
to… 
Matching rate 
50% 100% 150% 50% 100% 150% 
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matching 
Water 
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+ Water/ 
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[0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* 
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/Tanzania 
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/Tanzania 
[0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* 
complement
ary projects 
Water 
/Tanzania 
+ school 
in 
Tanzania 
[0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* 
School 
/Tanzania 
+ Water/ 
Tanzania 
[0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* 
substitution
ary projects 
Water 
/Tanzania 
+ Water/ 
Uganda 
[0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* 
School 
/Tanzania 
+ School/ 
Uganda 
[0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* [0,…,10]* 
 * random suggestion in Euro 
Note: the shaded area highlights the treatments implemented in the first round. In the 
rounds 2–9 all treatments were implemented in random order.  
 
Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the WZB-TU laboratory in the late summer and early fall 
2015. In 11 sessions we had 261 participants, a substantial number of them being students of 
engineering. The choice of the receiving organization was, thus, likely to be aligned with the 
interests of many participants. Indeed, 43% stated having known the organization before the 
experiment and it was held in high esteem receiving an average rating of 8.16 out of 10. 
Recruitment was conducted using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and the experiment itself was 
programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The instructions were in German and were 
presented on the computer screen. 
After presenting a short explanation about the basic structure of the experiments, subjects 
received detailed information about the charitable organization, the type of projects, etc. Then 
they separately received the information about the projects relevant for the experiment. In all 
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of the 10 rounds the participants received a budget of €10, which they could allocate between 
themselves and the organization. The division could be made at the cent level. The donations 
were matched at the rate of 50, 100, or 150% and the matching money went either to the same 
project or to a partner project (which was a substitute or a complement).  
For the decision we used a graphic interface (see Figure 4) that also visualized the effect of 
the match. Participants could move a slider and bars showing the subject’s account, the 
donation, and the matched amount changed with each movement. At the beginning of each 
round the slider appeared at a random position—which can be interpreted as a non-binding 
suggestion7. There was no time limit. Only after all subject confirmed their choices the next 
round would start.  
 
Figure 4: Budget division between subject’s account, the donation, and the visualization of the 
matching rate. 
  
 
 
The first round implemented only one matching rate—100%. The following 8 rounds 
implemented the remaining 8 treatments (3x3-1) in random order. The last round repeated the 
first. Whether the donations could be made towards the water or school project was not 
changed during the experiment.  
We explained to the participants that one randomly chosen round was going to be payoff 
relevant in the end. We also explained to them that all donations including the matching 
money from the randomly chosen round was going to be forwarded to Ingenieure ohne 
Grenzen. Donations were to be put in an original sealed donation box before their eyes after 
the experiment. 
                                                          
7 For a literature about non-binding contribution suggestions, see e.g. Adena et al. (2014) or Altmann et al. 
(2016). 
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Before the end of the experiment, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire covering 
sociodemographic characteristics and their perception of the charitable organization and the 
projects. Finally, the randomly chosen round determined the subject’s payoff and the 
donation. In addition, participants received a show up fee of 5 Euros. The experiment took, on 
average, around 30-40 minutes. 
 
Results 
On average, participants donated €5.33 (sd €3.10) to the charitable organization. There was 
substantial variation in donation values with €10, €5, and €0 being the amounts chosen most 
often (see Figure B1 in the appendix). A substantial share of donations amounted to the 
maximum of €10 (17.2%) and 9.2% of individuals always donated the maximum. 7.2% of 
donations were €0 but only 1.9% of individuals always donated €0.  
In regressions, we identify the effects of different matching schemes, matching rates and 
suggestions, and control for individual characteristics or fixed effects, as well as time effects. 
Our main focus is on the interaction between matching rate and the type of matching scheme.  
The first two columns of table 4 present the results from pooled OLS with robust clustered 
standard errors; the next two columns present the results from regression with individual fixed 
effects; the final column shows the results from a tobit regression with the lower limit being 
zero, the upper limit being 10, and including subject dummies.  
Notice that we force all treatments to have the same intercept simply because the zero 
matching counterfactual is identical for all three types of matching schemes (standard, 
substitute, complement). Our key result is the positive coefficient for the interaction term of 
matching rate and complement dummy. It shows that matching improves significantly when 
under the alternative scheme with a complementary project. For all specification, the slope of 
the matching coefficient improves by around 0.2. Notice that this is despite the fact that the 
standard matching scheme exhibits local crowding in in our experiment which works 
somewhat against our prediction as there is less room for improvement. Nevertheless 
crowding in does get even stronger with a complementary project.  
In contrast, we do not find any significant effects of replacing standard matching with an 
alternative scheme where the match goes to a partner project that is arguably a substitute for 
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the base project. The coefficient on the interaction of matching rate and substitute dummy is 
small and not significant. 
We also find a significant effect of suggestions which is largely in line with the previous 
literature (see, Adena et al. 2014). 
Table B3 in the appendix presents the results for the intensive and extensive margin 
separately. This table confirms the impression from the field that the alternative matching 
scheme works on the intensive margin only, reducing crowding out without additional 
increases in the response rate. The same holds for the suggestion while, in contrast, the 
matching rate affects donations on both margins.  
 
Table 4: Results from the regression analysis 
 Pooled OLS Fixed effects Tobit 
Matching rate 0.572*** 
(0.132) 
0.587*** 
(0.134) 
0.589*** 
(0.085) 
0.588*** 
(0.085) 
0.800*** 
(0.105) 
Complements x 
Matching rate 
0.211*** 
(0.078) 
0.176** 
(0.078) 
0.175*** 
(0.068) 
0.175*** 
(0.067) 
0.208** 
(0.083) 
Substitutes x 
Matching rate 
0.086 
(0.067) 
0.079 
(0.066) 
0.072 
(0.068) 
0.073 
(0.067) 
0.077 
(0.083) 
+ €1 suggestion 0.037* 
(0.020) 
0.036* 
(0.020) 
0.038*** 
(0.011) 
0.037*** 
(0.011) 
0.045*** 
(0.013) 
Base school -0.422 
(0.360) 
-0.245 
(0.338) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
round dummies  
 
yes  
 
yes 
 
yes 
Individual 
characteristics* 
 
 
yes  
 
 
 
 
Fixed effects    yes  
Subject dummies     yes 
     
Constant 4.624*** 
(0.264) 
5.327*** 
(0.506) 
4.462*** 
(0.098) 
4.943*** 
(0.131) 
4.849*** 
(0.557) 
Individuals 261 255 261 261 261 
R2 0.013 0.129 0.040 0.058  
Pseudo R2     0.337 
Note: Individual characteristics include following dummies: gender, being in a master program, making ends 
meet without difficulties, making ends meet with great difficulties; and following demeaned continuous 
variables: self-assessment of math proficiency and age, IOG rating. In pooled OLS clustered robust errors are 
computed. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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6 Conclusions  
We hypothesized that matching donations for one project with contributions to another project 
might be a promising alternative to traditional matching schemes. Earlier studies of matched 
fundraising have indicated that standard matching might be problematic as it causes partial 
crowding out and hinted at the superiority of fundraising campaigns where large lead gifts are 
simply announced as unconditional. However, competition might force charitable 
organizations to employ matching nevertheless. Ceteris paribus, donors will prefer to give to 
fundraising calls that offer more rather than less matching.  
In a simple theoretical sketch we showed that, for rather general assumptions on donors’ 
preferences, matching schemes that introduce a second charitable good towards which the 
matched amount is allocated can outperform standard matching. Taking our inspiration from 
these considerations, we conducted a field experiment to shed some light on this idea. 
We investigated four different fundraising schemes: two environments with lead donors for 
the two different charitable goods, standard (1:1) linear matching in the same good, and an 
alternative matching scheme in which the (1:1) matching amount is allocated to a second 
project. For standard linear matching we observed substantial crowding out which, however, 
was attenuated when the matched amount was allocated to a second project likely to be 
perceived as a (non-perfect) substitute to the first. Indeed our point estimates suggest that 
there was no crowding out under the novel matching scheme. As the two projects are not too 
dissimilar we conjectured that alternative designs with a second project that is a weaker 
substitute should improve outcomes even further.  
In a lab experiment, we set out to analyze the last point in more detail. We compared standard 
matching with two alternative schemes: one where the matching amount was allocated to a 
partner project likely to be perceived as a complement and one where the match went to a 
partner project likely to be perceived as a substitute. The lab experiment provides clear 
evidence of the superior performance of the alternative matching scheme with a partner 
project that is a complement. The alternative matching scheme with a partner project that is a 
substitute shows only weak and non-significant improvements in performance. 
Our findings suggest a new promising avenue for improving matching in the field but also 
show that caution is needed when choosing the partner project—ideally the projects should be 
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complements (although all our results show that matching with a substitute is never worse 
than using the match for the same project). This suggests some similarity to and possibly an 
alternative explanation for the success of the fundraising strategy proposed by Gneezy et al. 
(2015). In their experiment individuals could donate to the main project such that every Dollar 
directly increased the output while the overheads were covered by a lead donor. The 
complementarity of those two “projects” is at hand.  
We view our study as a proof of concept. It demonstrates that charitable organizations might 
be able to improve the success of their fundraising schemes substantially by trying out more 
imaginative forms of matching. This would retain the advantages of matching in competitive 
environments while avoiding crowding out.   
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Appendix A 
Mail-out letter (original) 
Spendenaufruf für das JETZT! OPER FÜR DICH  
es ist ein großes Anliegen der Oper Frankfurt, Kinder und Jugendliche aus dem Rhein-Main-Gebiet 
mit altersgerechten Angeboten an die faszinierende Welt von Oper und Musik heranzuführen. JETZT! 
OPER FÜR DICH fördert kulturelle Bildung und soziale Integration.  
Auch in der Spielzeit 14/15 steht die Oper Frankfurt vor der Herausforderung,  
(T1, T3) Aramsamsam, einen wichtigen Pfeiler des JETZT! Programms für Kinder im Alter von 2-4 
Jahren, durchzuführen. Die Realisierung des künstlerisch und pädagogisch anspruchsvollen Projekts 
(T2) Oper für Kinder unterwegs, einen wichtigen Pfeiler des JETZT! Programms für Grundschüler, 
durchzuführen. Die Realisierung des künstlerisch und pädagogisch anspruchsvollen Projekts 
(T4) Aramsamsam und Oper für Kinder unterwegs, wichtige Pfeiler des JETZT! Programms für 
Kinder von 2-4 Jahren bzw. für Grundschüler, durchzuführen. Die Realisierung der künstlerisch und 
pädagogisch anspruchsvollen Projekte 
bedeutet für das Haus einen großen finanziellen Aufwand, für den leider kaum Mittel im Haushaltsetat 
vorgesehen sind.  
Ein Förderer, der anonym bleiben möchte, konnte bereits gewonnen werden.  
(T1, T2) Er unterstützt JETZT! OPER FÜR DICH mit insgesamt 30.000 €.  
(T3) Er wird Aramsamsam unterstützen: Für jede Spende, die für Aramsamsam eingeht, spendet er den 
gleichen Betrag noch einmal für Aramsamsam - bis zu einem Maximum von 30.000 € insgesamt, das 
uns der Spender im Rahmen unserer Kampagne für JETZT! OPER FÜR DICH zur Verfügung stellt. 
(T4) Er wird Oper für Kinder unterwegs unterstützen: Für jede Spende, die für Aramsamsam eingeht, 
spendet er den gleichen Betrag noch einmal für Oper für Kinder unterwegs - bis zu einem Maximum 
von 30.000 € insgesamt, das uns der Förderer im Rahmen unserer Kampagne für JETZT! OPER FÜR 
DICH zur Verfügung stellt. 
(T1, T3) Helfen auch Sie! Mit Ihrem Engagement tragen Sie dazu bei, dass Aramsamsam 
weiterhin angeboten und ausgebaut werden kann.  
(T2) Helfen auch Sie! Mit Ihrem Engagement tragen Sie dazu bei, dass Oper für Kinder 
unterwegs weiterhin angeboten und ausgebaut werden kann.  
(T4) Helfen auch Sie! Mit Ihrem Engagement tragen Sie dazu bei, dass Aramsamsam und Oper 
für Kinder unterwegs weiterhin angeboten und ausgebaut werden können. 
Weitere Informationen finden Sie in der beiliegenden Projektbeschreibung. Bei Fragen ist das 
Development-Team (Tel. XXXXXX) gerne für Sie da.  
Als Dankeschön verlosen wir unter den Spendern einen Opernbesuch für 2 Personen sowie 20 Bücher 
„Ein Haus für das Theater“.  
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!  
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Mit freundlichen Grüßen  
 
Mail-out letter (translation) 
Call for donations for the JETZT! OPER FÜR DICH 
It is a major concern of the Opera Frankfurt to introduce children and adolescents of the Rhine-Main 
Region to the fascinating world of opera and music by offering age-appropriate attractions. JETZT! 
OPER FÜR DICH [NOW! OPERA FOR YOU] enhances cultural education and social integration. 
Also in the 14/15 season, the Opera Frankfurt faces the challenge of offering  
(T1, T3) Aramsamsam, an important pillar of the JETZT! [NOW!] program for children aged 2–4. The 
realization of this artistically and pedagogically ambitious project  
(T2) Oper für Kinder unterwegs [Opera on the go for children], an important pillar of the JETZT! 
[NOW!] program for elementary school students. The realization of this artistically and pedagogically 
ambitious project 
(T4) Aramsamsam and Oper für Kinder unterwegs [Opera on the go for children], important pillars of 
the JETZT! [NOW!] program for children aged 2–4 and elementary school students. The realization of 
these artistically and pedagogically ambitious projects 
implies a large financial outlay for the opera, which exceeds unfortunately the opera’s budget. 
We have already succeeded in attracting a sponsor for our program, who wishes to remain anonymous. 
(T1, T2) He is supporting JETZT! OPER FÜR DICH with an amount of €30,000. 
(T3) He is supporting Aramsamsam: For each donation for Aramsamsam, the sponsor will donate the 
same amount to Aramsamsam, up to a maximum of €30,000—the total amount he will provide for our 
campaign JETZT! OPER FÜR DICH. 
(T4) He is supporting Oper für Kinder unterwegs: For each donation for Aramsamsam, the sponsor 
will donate the same amount to Oper für Kinder unterwegs, up to a maximum of €30,000—the total 
amount he will provide for our campaign JETZT! OPER FÜR DICH. 
(T1, T3) Please help us too! Your commitment will contribute to ensuring that Aramsamsam 
continues to be offered and improved. 
(T2) Please help us too! Your commitment will contribute to ensuring that Oper für Kinder 
unterwegs continues to be offered and improved. 
(T4) Please help us too! Your commitment will contribute to ensuring that Aramamsam and 
Oper für Kinder unterwegs continues to be offered and improved. 
Further information can be found in the enclosed material. If you have any questions, our development 
team would be delighted to help you [No. XXXXX]. 
As a thank you, we will raffle a pair of opera tickets and twenty books “Ein Haus für das Theater” [“A 
house for the theatre”] among all our donors. 
With many thanks for your support and best wishes, 
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Enclosed material (Original and Translation) 
 
(T1, T3, T4)  ARAMSAMSAM – die Mitmachkonzerte der Oper Frankfurt für die Kleinsten!  
Mit Aramsamsam hat die Oper Frankfurt ein neues Projekt initiiert, das schon den Jüngsten  
unabhängig ihrer sozialen Herkunft den Zugang zu Kultur ermöglicht. Die Zielgruppe der Kleinkinder 
zwischen zwei und vier Jahren kommt zusammen mit vertrauten Personen, z.B. ihren Eltern oder ihrer 
Kita-Gruppe, am Vormittag in das Holzfoyer der Oper. In den Aramsamsam-Konzerten wird für und 
mit Kindern gesungen und musiziert. Hier findet ein erster Kontakt zu Liedern und Melodien statt; die 
Kinder werden spielerisch in die Welt der Musik eingeführt. Die Konzerte haben jeweils einen 
Themenschwerpunkt, der eine Verbindung zum täglichen Leben der Jüngsten darstellt. In dieser 
Spielzeit können die Kinder die Themen SONNE, MOND UND STERNE sowie LUFTSPRÜNGE 
musikalisch erleben und kennenlernen. 
(T1, T3, T4)  ARAMSAMSAM – the join-in concerts of the Opera Frankfurt for the little ones! 
Aramsamsam is a new project initiated by the Opera Frankfurt, which enables even the youngest 
children, regardless of social background, to access culture. The target audience of toddlers aged 2–4 
arrives in the morning at the opera’s Holzfoyer accompanied by familiar faces, e.g. their parents or 
their kindergarten group. During the Aramsamsam concerts, the actors sing and play instruments for 
and with the children. This is where the children get in touch with songs and melodies for the first 
time; thus they become playfully introduced to the world of music. Each concert contains a key 
subject, which expresses a connection to the children’s daily lives. During the current season the 
children may musically experience the subjects SONNE, MOND UND STERNE [Sun, moon and 
stars] and LUFTSPRÜNGE [leaping in the air]. 
(T2, T4)  OPER FÜR KINDER UNTERWEGS – die mobile Produktion der Oper Frankfurt! 
Die Oper Frankfurt versorgt mit einem mobilen Angebot zahlreiche Institutionen des gesamten Rhein-
Main-Gebietes: Unser Opernbus tourt jährlich mit einer Oper für Kinder durch Schulen und andere 
soziale Einrichtungen, wie z.B. die Praunheimer Werkstätten und die Uniklinik Frankfurt. Das Projekt 
ermöglicht Schülern aller sozialer Schichten, Menschen mit Behinderung und Patienten einen 
spielerischen (Erst -) Kontakt zu Welt der Oper. Die Bearbeitungen großer Opernwerke sind für alle 
leicht verständlich. Mit im Gepäck ist natürlich auch das Opernensemble: direkt vor Ort erleben die 
Zuhörer die Künstler, die sich ihrerseits schon auf ein Wiedersehen mit den kleinen und großen 
Experten im Opernhaus freuen. 
(T2, T4)  OPERA ON THE GO FOR CHILDREN – the mobile production unit of the Opera 
Frankfurt! 
The Opera Frankfurt serves a numerous institutions throughout the Rhine-Main region with a mobile 
service: our opera bus and its opera for children annually tours schools and other social facilities like, 
for example, the Praunheimer Workshop and the University Hospital Frankfurt. This project allows 
students of all social classes, people with disabilities, and patients their (first) contact with the world of 
opera. The adaptations of large-scale operatic works are easily understandable for everyone. The opera 
ensemble comes as part of the package: the audiences directly experience the artists, who are already 
looking forward to seeing the younger and older experts in the opera again. 
Appendix B 
Table B1: Random assignment of recipients into treatments in the field experiment 
Mean, standard error in parentheses 
P-value on test of equality of means in box brackets 
 
Treatment Treatment description Comparison 
group 
Number of 
recipients 
Female  
[Yes=1] 
Couple  
[Yes=1] 
PhD or 
Professor 
[Yes=1] 
Subscriber  
[Yes=1] 
Frankfurt 
resident 
[Yes=1] 
Days since 
last order8 
Number of 
orders 
Average value 
of order 
order value 
(sum) 
T1 Lead donor 
(Aramsamsam) 
 6,143 .503 .019 .116 .289 .369 301 6.81 114.92 800.07 
    (.006) (.002) (.004) (.006) (.006) (2.205) (.125) (1.43) (20.43) 
T2 Lead donor (Opera 
Bus) 
 6,143 .500 .019 .120 .287 .378 308 6.43 118.42 782.77 
    (.006) (.002) (.004) (.006) (.006) (2.204) (.119) (1.48) (17.54) 
T3 Standard matching 
(Aramsamsam + 
Aramsamsam) 
 6,143 .504 .022 .119 .293 .376 304 6.88 115.92 814.21 
    (.006) (.002) (.004) (.006) (.006) (2.228) (.126) (1.50) (19.28) 
T4 Alternative matching 
(Aramsamsam + 
Opera Bus) 
 6,144 .509 .019 .109 .295 .371 302 6.97 115.33 811.67 
    (.006) 
 
(.002) (.004) (.006) (.006) (2.226) (.128) (1.51) (17.74) 
  (1)=(2)  [0.732] [0.947] [0.433] [0.735] [0.314] [0.024] [0.027] [0.088] [0.521] 
  (1)=(3)  [0.857] [0.144] [0.575] [0.648] [0.467] [0.240] [0.691] [0.627] [0.615] 
  (1)=(4)  [0.477] [0.843] [0.240] [0.491] [0.843] [0.567] [0.367] [0.843] [0.668] 
  (2)=(3)  [0.601] [0.163] [0.823] [0.426] [0.780] [0.282] [0.009] [0.235] [0.228] 
  (2)=(4)  [0.291] [0.896] [0.050] [0.304] [0.419] [0.093] [0.002] [0.144] [0.247] 
  (3)=(4)  [0.595] [0.206] [0.083] [0.817] [0.596] [0.548] [0.610] [0.780] [0.923] 
Notes: The tests of equality in box brackets are based on a mean comparison t-test against a two sided alternative hypothesis.
                                                          
8 In the database of customers. 
 Table B2: Detailed regression results for the field experiment 
 
Specification Response  Value of donations (nonzero) Return  
      
Dependent variable Donation dummy log(donation)| 
donation >0 
log(donation)| 
donation >0 
log(donation+1) log(donation+1) 
      
Method  probit (m.e.)  OLS QRE (m.e. at 
median) 
OLS tobit (m.e. y*) 
Column I II III IV V 
T2: Lead donor (Opera 
Bus) 
0.003 -0.002 -0.021 0.011 0.012 
 (0.002) (0.126) (0.131) (0.010) (0.010) 
      
T3: Standard matching 
(Aramsamsam + 
Aramsamsam) 
0.006** -0.237** -0.282** 0.020** 0.024** 
 (0.002) (0.120) (0.125) (0.010) (0.010) 
      
T4: Alternative 
matching 
(Aramsamsam + Opera 
Bus) 
0.004* -0.104 -0.086 0.014 0.018* 
 (0.002) (0.122) (0.127) (0.010) (0.010) 
      
number of orders 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.006*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
average value of order 
(in 100 Euros) 
0.002*** 0.217*** 0.197*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.035) (0.036) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
subscription holder 0.005*** -0.062 -0.044 0.010 0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.098) (0.101) (0.010) (0.008) 
      
time since last activity 
(in months) 
-0.001*** -0.003 0.001 -0.002*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
female -0.000 -0.200** -0.108 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.086) (0.089) (0.007) (0.007) 
      
couple -0.001 0.288 0.443* 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.254) (0.263) (0.026) (0.023) 
      
PhD or professor -0.004 0.090 0.084 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.003) (0.136) (0.141) (0.011) (0.012) 
      
Frankfurt resident -0.001 0.026 0.085 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.087) (0.090) (0.008) (0.007) 
      
Observations 24573 447 447 24573 24573 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure B1: The distribution of donations (all rounds) in the laboratory experiment 
 
 
Table B3: Regression results for the intensive and extensive margin separately—laboratory 
experiment 
Dependent 
variable 
Donation dummy Donation>0 
 Probit Pooled OLS Fixed effects 
   
       
matching rate 0.421*** 
(0.113) 
0.593*** 
(0.136) 
0.265** 
(0.110) 
0.271** 
(0.108) 
0.293*** 
(0.077) 
0.294*** 
(0.077) 
complement 0.071 
(0.060) 
0.041 
(0.082) 
0.182** 
(0.070) 
0.173** 
(0.071) 
0.182*** 
(0.060) 
0.182*** 
(0.060) 
substitute 0.034 
(0.060) 
-0.007 
(0.080) 
0.068 
(0.069) 
0.089 
(0.067) 
0.084 
(0.060) 
0.085 
(0.060) 
Base school -0.500*** 
(0.189) 
-0.550*** 
(0.198) 
-0.017 
(0.341) 
0.065 
(0.334) 
 
 
 
 
+ €1 
suggestion 
0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.015) 
0.033* 
(0.019) 
0.036* 
(0.019) 
0.039*** 
(0.010) 
0.039*** 
(0.010) 
Individual 
characteristics 
 
 
yes  
 
yes  
 
 
 
round 
dummies 
 
 
yes  
 
yes  
 
yes 
 
Constant 1.210*** 
(0.148) 
1.285*** 
(0.339) 
5.232*** 
(0.241) 
6.265*** 
(0.503) 
5.157*** 
(0.089) 
5.499*** 
(0.118) 
Observations 2610 2550 2421 2374 2421 2421 
R2   0.004 0.093 0.025 0.039 
Pseudo R2 0.049 0. 293     
 
Laboratory experiment, between subjects results, first round 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Donation value
28 
 
In the first round we implemented a reduced number of treatments, concentrating on a 
comparison between matching schemes keeping the matching rate constant at 100%. Those 
treatments are presented below. 
Figure B2: Treatments implemented in the first round 
  Base project water  Base project school 
Type of 
matching 
Donation 
to… +  
matching 
to… 
Matching rate Donation 
to… +  
matching 
to… 
Matching rate 
100% 100% 
standard 
matching 
Water 
/Tanzania 
+ Water/ 
Tanzania 
[0,…,10]* 
School 
/Tanzania 
+ School 
/Tanzania 
[0,…,10]* 
complement
ary projects 
Water 
/Tanzania 
+ school 
in 
Tanzania 
[0,…,10]* 
School 
/Tanzania 
+ Water/ 
Tanzania 
[0,…,10]* 
substitution
ary projects 
Water 
/Tanzania 
+ Water/ 
Uganda 
[0,…,10]* 
School 
/Tanzania 
+ School/ 
Uganda 
[0,…,10]* 
 * random suggestion in Euro 
Note: the shaded area highlights the treatments implemented in the first round. In the 
rounds 2–9 all treatments were implemented in random order.  
When looking at the first round only (our between-subject results), the treatments with 
matching on complementary projects resulted in higher average donations than standard 
matching but the difference of 51 cents (or 9%) is not significant. The matching on a 
substitutionary project results in only slightly higher donations and the difference is also not 
significant (see appendix B for more detailed analysis). The between-subject component of 
the experiment is simply underpowered because of the extremely flat distribution in 
individual donations. 
 
Figure B3: Donations in the first round 
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Note: 95% CIs. Both base projects and all different suggestions are lumped together. 
 
 
n=88 n=88 n=85
5
6
7
same project complements substitutes
Period 1
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